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  We address the question of the prediction of large failures, busts, or system collapse, and the 
necessary concepts related to risk quantification, minimization and management.  Answering this 
question requires a new approach since predictions using standard financial techniques and 
statistical distributions fail to predict or anticipate crises.  The key points are that financial 
markets, systems, trading and manoeuvres are not just about money, debt, stocks, instruments 
and assets but reflect the actions and motivations of humans, which includes the presence or 
absence of learning effects.  Therefore we have the possibility o f  f a i l u r e s ,  o r  r a r e  o r  l o w  
frequency events due to human involvement.  The rare or unknown event is directly due to 
human influence, and reflects both learning and risk taking, with the presence of the finite and 
persistent human error contribution while taking or exposed to risk.  This presence of humans in 
the marketplace explains the failure of present purely statistical methods to correctly estimate, 
predict or determine the onset of financial crises, busts and collapses. 
  In this essay, we unify the concepts for predicting financial systemic risk with the general 
theory for outcomes, trends and measures already derived for other technical and social systems 
with human involvement.  We replace words and qualitative reasoning with measures and 
quantitative predictions.  Risk is measured by our uncertainty, and the measure of uncertainty is 
probability.  
The paper is therefore written with an introductory section devoted to the measures relevant to 
risk prediction in other modern technological systems; and is then extended and applied 
specifically to risk prediction for financial and business systems.  The resulting measures also 
provide useful guidance for risk governance. Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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1. The Risk Measures and Assumptions 
 
Financial markets do not just involve money and statistics; just like all other modern systems 
they include people.  Therefore, to understand and predict markets it is essential to understand 
people, predicting their actions, mistakes, skills, decisions, responses, learning and motivation.  
To understand people we must explicitly include their learned and unlearnt behaviours(s) with 
experience and risk exposure.  This is what we attempt here, based on what has been learnt from 
other systems data.  We treat all outcomes such as failures, crises, busts and collapses as 
occurring with some probability, and that these adverse or unwelcome events reflect the inherent 
stability characteristics of financial markets.  As noted by a well known investor (Soros, 2009): 
“Since markets are unstable, there are systemic risks in addition to risks affecting individual 
market participants…Participants may ignore these systemic risks…but regulators cannot.” 
  We wish to make a failure prediction, using objective measures for risk and risk exposure, 
since all homo-technological systems have failures and we learn from them
1 The past outcomes 
for all homo-technological systems (industrial, transportation, production facilities) show clear 
evidence of trends, and the failures, busts and crises are due to both known and unknown causes 
and may be “rare” or “unlikely”. 
  Failure to predict failures is due to the improper and incomplete treatment of human error, 
learning and risk taking as part of the overall system.  Traditional risk analysis and prediction 
techniques do not explicitly include the dynamic variability due to the inherent human 
characteristics embedded in and inseparable from the system.  All major events and disasters, 
especially financial ones, include the dominant contribution not only from individual mistakes, 
but also management failures and corporate-wide and regulatory errors and blunders.  Risk is a 
measure of our uncertainty, and that uncertainty is determined by the probability of error.  We 
must also estimate and predict risk that also includes the unknown or rare event.  
  We try to find a dynamic objective measure that would actually anticipate instability, thus 
allowing predicting the onset of failure or large excursions (i.e. hence managing that risk and its 
consequences – equivalent to “emergency preparedness”). In the popular finance articles, the risk 
mitigation process seems to be referred to as “pricking bubbles”, and traditionally involves some 
kinds of ad-hoc debt, credit and trading limitations and/or restraints. These types of regulation or Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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reactions are very much a posteriori and case-by-case, but are neither predictive nor general. As 
noted for risk in Nanotechnology: “the real issue is how to regulate in the face of uncertainty” 
(Brown, S. 2009, 209). Our work suggests that learning is effective as a risk management and 
predictive tool, but only if we have adopted the “correct” risk exposure and uncertainty measures 
which we now attempt to determine.  
  Obviously, as humans, we learn from experience, both good and bad.  We also take risks and 
must make mistakes in order to improve.  A universal curve is derived for both collective and 
individual learning trends, naturally including the inevitability of outcomes and risk.  Based on 
our work studying and analyzing over 200 years of real data on and for risk in technological, 
medical, industrial and financial systems, five measures are presented and discussed for the 
objective measure of risk, failure probability and risk exposure.  Correct measure(s) for 
experience enable the prediction and uncertainty estimation for the entire range of rare, repeat 
and unknown outcomes (e.g., major industrial disasters, facility accidents and explosions, every 
day auto accidents, aircraft crashes, financial busts and market collapses). 
  We also introduce and present the unifying concept of risk and uncertainty derived from the 
information entropy as a quantitative measure of randomness and disorder.  We show how this 
allows comparative risk estimation and the discerning of insufficient learning.  Since these risk 
measures and learning trends have been largely derived from data including the financial arena, 
we show how to generalize these to include the presence of market pressures, financial issues 
and risk measures.  We define and present the bases, analyses and results for new risk measures 
for the quantitative predictions of risk exposure, failure and collapse using relevant experience 
including: 
a)  Universal Learning (ULC), similar to the Black-Scholes concept; 
b)  Risk Ratios (RR) and exposure, as derived from empirical hazard curves;  
c)  Repeat Event Predictions (REP) or ‘never happening again’, equivalent to birthday 
matching and re-occurring echoes; 
d)  Rare and Unknown Outcome occurrences (UU), as in the black swan concept; 
e)  System and Organizational Stability (SOS) or resilience criteria, using the information 
entropy concept. Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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  We provide quantified examples for production processes, transportation losses, major 
hazards and financial exposure.  These new concepts also provide the probability of success, the 
emergence of order and the understanding and quantification of risk perception.  Note that these 
measures replace and do not include in any way the standard financial techniques utilizing net 
value, value at risk, or variations about or from the mean.  
  In our analysis we assume financial markets are just another homo-technological system and 
the past failure rate(s) inform the future, and that the inherent apparent randomness and chaos 
conveys and contains information. We avoid using traditional statistical approaches where past 
failure frequencies define invariant future failure probability distributions. We also explicitly 
avoid the impossible modeling of all the internal details of assets and trading, and avoid any 
filtering of data; we consider only emergent trends at system level based on what we know. We 
treat risk as determined by experience or risk exposure, thus avoiding using comfortable calendar 
time intervals (i.e., as in daily, hourly, monthly, quarterly or annual reporting) as markets operate 
according to their experience. As in medical and other systems, this risk measure is often 
determined by the dynamic accumulated “volume” which also provides the learning opportunity. 
Our research approach is predicated on extrapolating known and unknown past failure rates 
based on experience and future dynamic risk exposure, and is tested against data, so the concept 
and measures of risk and stability are truly falsifiable. 
 
2  Risk: How we learn from experience and what we know about risk prediction 
  
Risk is measured by our uncertainty, and the measure of uncertainty is probability.  
  The definition, use and concepts of risk adopted in the present paper utilizes measures for 
risk exposure and for uncertainty that encompass and are consistent with that proposed before in 
the financial literature (Holton, G., 2004, 19): 
“Risk entails two essential components: 
  Exposure, and 
  Uncertainty 
Risk, then, is exposure to a proposition of which one is uncertain.” 
  What is the risk of system failure?  What is the measure for exposure?  What is the measure 
of uncertainty?  To answer those questions we must understand how and why systems fail, and Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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show how to make a prediction, noting that while financial systems constitute a distinct 
discipline with its own terminology, they actually must behave just like all others that are prone 
to the all-to-common vagaries, actions and motivations of humans.  We use probability and 
information entropy to quantify uncertainty; and use past and future experience to quantify 
exposure. 
  We first review what is known and not known about predicting and managing risk in 
industrial, energy, transportation, nuclear, medical, and manufacturing systems, and the 
associated risk exposure measures.  We address the question of the predictability of a large 
systems failure, or collapse, and the necessary concepts related to risk quantification and system 
stability that are emerging from the physical sciences, cognitive psychology, information theory 
and multiple industrial arenas that are relevant to current financial and economic market and 
stability concerns.  We have defined the risk of any outcome (being a proposition of which one is 
uncertain) as caused by uncertainty, and that the measure of the uncertainty is probability, p.  We 
attempt to use some of these risk concepts, learning and applications from mainly operational 
systems to inform risk prediction for financial systems. 
  Risks are due to the probability/possibility of an adverse event, outcome, or accident.  Simply 
put, we learn from our mistakes, correcting our errors along the way.  We all know that we have 
had a serious failure of the financial and investments markets due to excessive risk exposure and 
losses.  The key observation is that markets are random, which is confirmed by sampling 
distributions, but we also know that conventional statistics of normal distributions (such as used 
in VaR and CoVaR techniques) do not work when applied to predicting dynamically changing 
accident, event and outcome trends (Taleb, 2007) (Duffey and Saull, 2008).  So while the 
instantaneous behaviour appears to be random and hence unpredictable, the failure to predict is 
due to the failure to properly include the systematic influence of human element, which is non-
linear, dynamic and varies with experience and risk exposure. 
  In industrial operations, the cardinal rule of operation applicable to any system is due to 
Howlett (Howlett, 2001) which is: 
“Humans must remain in control of their machinery at all times.  Any time the machine operates 
without the knowledge, understanding and assent of its human controllers, the machine is out of 
control.” Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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  Further the limits to operation are defined by a Safe Operating Envelope, with limits that 
include margins and uncertainty that define “guarantees” for the avoidance of failure.  Risk 
management is then employed to protect or mitigate the consequences of failures that might 
occur anyway (Howlett, 2001).  These well-tried concepts are all translatable to and usable in 
financial systems, just as they are for industrial systems, since all systems include human 
involvement and hence involve the uncertainty due to risk taking and learning.    
  We have previously shown that the dominant contribution to all management and system 
failures, outcomes and accidents is from that same inextricable and inseparable human 
involvement.  Be they airplane, auto, train or stock market crashes, the same learning principles 
also apply.  We have shown that to quantify r i s k  w e  m u s t  i n c l u d e  the learning behaviour, 
quantifying outcomes rates and probabilities due to our experience from human decision making 
and involvement with modern technological and social systems, including industrial, 
transportation, chemical, financial and manufacturing technologies (Duffey and Saull, 2008) 
(Duffey and Saull, 2002).  These ideas and concepts include naturally not only the collective 
system (e.g., a bank, railway, power plant or airline) but also the individual human reliability 
(e.g., an investor, driver, manager or pilot). 
  What we know is that provided we have prior (outcome or failure) data we can now predict 
accurately the future outcomes rates, and define the risk exposure based on the past known and 
the future expected experience.  That we can learn from experience is what all the data show, 
and that experience is the past risk exposure we have all so painfully acquired as a human 
society.  The experience measure is a surrogate for our very human risk exposure, of how long, 
how many, how much we have been exposed to the chance of an outcome, or to the risk of an 
error. 
  The prediction of the future  rate of failures or outcomes is given from the Learning 
Hypothesis, being simply on the principle that humans naturally learn from their mistakes, by 
correcting and unlearning during and from the accumulated experience – both good and bad.  
The experience – however it is defined or measured – represents also not only the learning 
opportunity, it also is a measure of the risk exposure.  The probability of error, accident, 
catastrophe or mistake, p, is determined by the failure rate, which derives from the number of 
either a successful or a failed (unsuccessful) outcome.  The rate of outcomes decreases Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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exponentially with experience, in the form of a Universal Learning Curve (ULC).  Over 200 
years of experience and millions of prior, past or historic data allow the ULC to be defined.  The 
validation derives from massive datasets of both frequent and rare events  (Duffey and Saull, 
2002) and (Duffey and Saull, 2008) which now includes multiple sources and outcomes, with the 
historical time spans covering the past 200 years, with major data available from the last 50 or 
more years. 
  We analysed auto passenger deaths, railway injuries, coal mining deaths, oil spills at sea, 
commercial airline near misses, and recreational boating deaths. Globally, the learning data set 
we have amassed now contains multiple technologies worldwide: coal and gold mining; 20 
million pulmonary disease deaths; cataract operations; infant heart surgeries; the international 
total of rocket launches; pilot deaths in Australia; train derailments and danger signals passed on 
railways; and notably the anti-missile interception and destruction effectiveness over England of 
German V1 bombs in World War II.  Economic data on specific unit price variations with 
increasing output or commercial sales demonstrated the learning trends and so-called “progress 
curves” for manufacturing are observed for millions of units produced in factories and 
production lines. 
  The millions of outcome data analyzed are well represented by the Learning Hypothesis 
(Duffey and Saull, 2008) (Duffey and Saull, 2002) and which states that the rate of decrease of 
the outcome or failure rate, λ, with experience units, τ, is proportional to that same rate.  Thus, 
very simply, the differential equation is the proportionality: 
 
(dλ/dτ) – λ.  
 
  The above cases and data sets show variations in the learning constant: when learning trends 
are present an average learning rate “constant” of proportionality value of k~3, is  reasonable 
(see also Figure 1). 
  Systems exist that do not show significant learning, as measured by decrease or declining loss 
and error trends, are those where the continuing influence and reliance on the human element and 
historic practices overrides massive changes in technology and the robustness of system design.  
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3 Individual  Actions:  Predictable and Unpredictable 
 
It is reasonable to ask how the behaviour of entire systems reflect the individual interactions 
within them, and vice versa, including the myriads of managers, accountants, traders, investors, 
speculators, lawyers, and regulators that make up a financial market or system.  This link is 
between the unobserved multitudinous and microscopic interactions and the observed 
macroscopic and emergent system trends, distributions, responses and outcomes.  For just 
individual actions (as opposed to system outcomes), data are available in the psychological 
literature from many thousands of individual human subject task and learning trials.  These trials 
have established the rate of skill acquisition is described by so-called Laws of Practice.  We have 
shown (Duffey and Saull, 2008) that these Laws are entirely consistent with the ULC for entire 
systems, have the same learning constant (or K value) with repeated trials.  Thus, the data show 
that external system-learning behaviour mirrors the internal learning trends of the individuals 
within.  The predicted probability of error also agrees with published nuclear plants events, 
simulator tests and system recovery action times.  Probabilities for power restoration for power 
losses at over 100 US nuclear power plants, are also in agreement; as is the power blackout 
repair probability for customers over a period of several days. 
  In all these data, we have, n, outcomes occurring in some experience, τ.  The resulting form 
of the learning curve is shown in Figure 1, which is a log-log plot with arbitrary units on each 
axis of the rate of the undesirable errors and outcomes, dn/dτ, versus the accumulated experience, 
which is a surrogate for the risk exposure during actual system operation.  This risk exposure or 
experience measure, τ, is unique for each and every system: for aircraft is the number of flights 
flown; for railways the train-miles travelled; for ships the shipping-years afloat; for 
manufacturing the number of units produced; for human errors in decision making, skill 
acquisition and response time it is the number of repetitive trials, etc., etc. 
  As we increase our experience and risk exposure, as both individuals and systems, the event 
or outcome rate depends on whether, either collectively and/or individually, we follow a learning 
curve of decreasing risk or not, or we are somewhere in between. In Figure 1, the line labeled 
“learning curve” (from the Minimum Error Rate Equation, or MERE) is the desirable ULC, 
where learning occurs to rapidly reduce the rate. This is the most likely path, and is also that of Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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the least risk as we progress from being a “novice” with little experience to becoming an “expert 
with progressively more exposure and experience”.  There are no “zero defects”; there is always 
a finite, non-zero residual rate of error, λm, so say all of the world’s data.  The equation that 
describes the learning curve is an exponential with experience
2:  
 
Failure rate, λ(τ)=Minimum rate, λm+(Initial rate, λ0–Minimum rate, λm) x exp–(kτ) 
 
  If we simply replace the rate, λ, by the value or specific cost, C, and change the sign, the 
MERE turns out to be identical in form to that of the trending part of the Black-Scholes equation 
for portfolio cost and value.  For manufacturing or production there is a “tail” of non-zero value 
that corresponds to the minimum possibly achievable, Cm, in any competitive market system. 
Reducing cost with increasing “volume”, or units produced, thus also holds for manufacturing 
and production cost decreases, just as “patient volume” does for improving individual surgical 
skill, thus reducing inadvertent deaths with increasing patient count (being practice or trials).  
The difference is that in these cases the experience parameter, τ, is conventionally taken as either 
time (for stock or equity values variation) or accumulated units manufactured (for production 
prices changes), and a key question is what measure to adopt in financial systems for the relevant 
experience and risk exposure. Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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Figure 1  The ULC and Constant Risk Lines; Failure rates with increasing experience and/or risk exposure. 
  Since Figure 1 is a log-log plot (scale units are factors of ten on each axis), any line of 
constant risk is then a straight line of slope minus one, where the event rate, , times experience, 
, is the constant number of events, n. Hence,  = n/, and for the first or rare event, n = 1, which 
is the dashed “constant risk” line for any first or rare event shown in Figure 1.  The rate 
decreases inversely with the risk exposure or experience, so importantly,  at little of no 
experience or little learning, the initial rate is given by λ0 = 1/τ, which is exactly the form of the 
rare events as derived from commercial aircraft crashes.  As we shall see, this risk path is the 
initial rate and also emphasizes the “fat tail” that worries and confounds conventional risk and 
value analysts.  We call this prediction a White Elephant when it underestimates the risk, since it 
has no value as a prediction. 
  In terms of probabilities as a measure of risk, instead of rates, the above equation can be 
integrated to yield an expression that in words implies: 
  Risk exposure probability is due to the minimum risk plus the initial risk exposure less the 
reduction in risk due to learning. 
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  For any real, not hypothetical system the minimum achievable failure rate does not appear to 
change and has not changed for over 200 years, depending solely on our experience and risk 
exposure measure for a given system.  So conversely, the systemic risk (the probability of failure 
or a bust) is dependent on the risk exposure measure. 
 
4  The Seven Commonalities of Rare and Terrible Events: Risk Ratios and Predictions 
 
What do large disasters, crises, busts and collapses in financial systems like the Great Crash of 
2008  (IMF, 2009) have in common with the other major events?  These have happened in 
multiple technologies and industries, such as in industries as diverse as aerospace (Columbia and 
Challenger Shuttle losses) (CAIB, 2003), nuclear (Davis-Besse plant vessel corrosion) (NRC, 
2008), oil (Deepwater Horizon explosion and leak) (US National Commission, 2011), chemical 
(Toulouse ammonia plant explosion) (Barthelemy, 2001) and transportation (the Quebec 
overpass collapse) (Marchand and Denis, 2007).  The common features, or as we may call them 
the Seven Themes, cover the aspects of causation, rationalization, retribution, and prevention that 
ad nausea are all too familiar: 
 First, these major losses, failures and outcomes all share the same very same and very human 
Four Phases or warning signs: the unfolding of the precursors and initiating circumstances; the 
confluence of events and circumstances in unexpected ways; the escalation where the 
unrecognised unknowingly happens; and, afterwards, denial and blame shift before final 
acceptance. 
 Second, as always, these incidents all involved humans, were not expected but clearly 
understandable as due to management emphasis on production and profit rather than safety and 
risk, from gaps in the operating and management requirements, and from lax inspection and 
inadequate regulations.  
 Third, these events have all caused a spate of media coverage, retroactive soul-searching, 
“culture” studies and surveys, regulation review, revisions to laws, guidelines and procedures, 
new limits and reporting legislation, which all echo perfectly the present emphasis on limits to 
the “bonus culture” and “risk taking” that are or were endemic in certain financial circles. Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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 Fourth, the failures were so-called “rare events” and involved obvious dynamic human lapses 
and errors, and as such do not follow the usual statistical rules and laws that govern large quasi-
static samples, or the multitudinous outcome distributions (like normal, lognormal and Weibull) 
that dominate conventional statistical thinking, but clearly require analysis and understanding of 
the role of human learning, experience and skill in making mistakes and taking decisions. 
 Fifth, these events all involve humans operating inside and/or with a system, and contain real 
information about what we know about what we do not know, being the unexpected, the 
unknown, the rare and low occurrence rate events, with large consequences and highlighting our 
own inadequate predictive capability, so that to predict we must use Bayesian-type likelihood 
estimation.  
 Sixth, there is the learning paradox, that if we do not learn we have more risk, but to learn 
perversely we must have the very events we seek to avoid, which also have a large and finite risk 
of re-occurrence; and we ultimately have more risk from events we have not had the chance to 
learn about, being the unknown, rare or unexpected. 
 Seventh, these events were all preventable but only afterwards  with 20/20 hindsight soul-
searching and sometimes massive inquiries reveal what was so obvious time after time; the same 
human fallibilities, performance lapses, supervisory and inspections gaps, bad habits, inadequate 
rules and legislation, management failures, and risk taking behaviours that all should have been 
and were self-evident, and were uncorrected. 
  We claim to learn from these each time, perhaps introducing corrective actions, revised rules 
and lessons learned (Ohlsson, 1996), thus hopefully reducing the outcome rate or the chance of 
re-occurrence. All of these aspects were also evident in the financial failure of 2008, in the 
collapse of major financial institutions and banks.  These rare events are worth examining further 
as to their repeat frequency and market failure probability: recessions have happened before but 
2008 was supposedly somewhat different, as it was reportedly due to unbridled systemic risk, 
and uncontrolled systemic failure in credit and real estate sectors.  This failure of risk 
management in financial markets led to the analysis that follows, extending the observations, 
new thinking and methods developed for understanding other technological systems to the 
prediction and management of so-called “systemic risk” in financial markets and transactions.  
We treat and analyze these financial entities as “systems” which function and “behave” by Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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learning from experience just like any other system, where we observe the external outcomes and 
failures due to the unobserved internal activities, management decisions, errors and risks taken. 
  The past outcome data provide the past failure rate. To determine the future risk, we must 
distinguish between the past (statistically, the known prior) and the future (statistically, the 
unknown posterior).  So what does the past tell us about the future?  To predict an outcome, any 
event, we must go beyond what we know, the prior knowledge.  Somehow, we have to project 
ourselves into an unknown future, with some measure of confidence and uncertainty, based on 
both our rational thoughts and our irrational fears, using what we know about what we do not 
know.  This leads us into the somewhat controversial arena of prediction using statistical 
reasoning, a subject addressed in great detail elsewhere (Jaynes, 2003). 
 The  conditional future is dependent, albeit with uncertainty, on the past, as per Bayes 
reasoning (Jaynes, 2003) (Bayes, 1763, 376).  The probability or chance of an unknown event is 
dependent on something called the likelihood, which itself is uncertain but provides a rational 
framework for projection.  The likelihood itself is inversely dependent on the prior number of 
outcomes, and if there are none so far, we just have the Bayesian failure rate of the past based on 
our (known) experience to date. 
  The Likelihood formally adjusts the past, prior or known probability and produces the future 
or Posterior probability.  So conditionally dependent on what we already know we know has 
already happened in the past, according to the thinking of the Reverend Thomas Bayes (1763) 
and of Edwin Jaynes’ (2004) rigorous analysis: 
 
  Future chance (posterior probability, p(P)) = Past or prior probability, p, times Likelihood  
 
  The Likelihood multiplier, p(L), whatever it is and however derived (by physical argument, 
guess, judgment, evidence, probabilistic reasoning, mathematical rigour or data analysis) is the 
conditioning factor which always alters the past whatever and however it is estimated.  Even if 
the past was indeed “normal” the likelihood can even change the future to include rare events 
and unknown unknowns.  
  The risk ratio (RR) can then be defined as ratio of the future posterior probability, p(P), of an 
adverse event (accident, outcome, error, or failure in the future) to some known past or present Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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failure probability, p(τ), based on the prior accumulated experience, as a function of the future 
risk exposure or experience, or 
 
RR = p(P)/p(τ). 
 
  From the above Bayesian equation this risk ratio is equivalent to defining the Likelihood, 
p(L), where for low probabilities or rare events the posterior, p(P), itself is numerically very 
nearly equal to the rate of events, or the failure rate, p(P)~f(τ)~λ. This result follows directly 
from the so-called “generalized Bayes formula” (Sveshnikov, 1968, 49 and 80)  (Duffey and 
Saull, 2008) that defines the Likelihood as the ratio of the probability of outcomes occurring in 
the next experience interval to the probability that outcomes have already occurred during the 
past experience.  
  So for low probability events, outcomes or disasters (p(τ)<<1), the Risk Ratio becomes 
simply the future predicted by the past since: 
 
RR = p(P)(1-p(τ))/p(τ) ~p(P)/p(τ) ~λ(τ)/p(τ) 
 
which is the ratio of the known past rate and prior probability. 
  We show the Risk Ratio, RR, prediction for rare events with little learning (k~0.0001) in 
Figure 2 versus a series of curves (k from 0.1 – 0.001) representing slow to negligible learning, 
where the Risk Ratio clearly has a slope varying as, 1/τ.  The key observation is that the future 
risk predicted by the risk ratio, RR, still does not fall much below ~10
-5 at large risk exposure, 
which corresponds to the plateau, or “fat tail”, caused by the lowest attainable but finite and non-
zero failure rate that is observed for any system anywhere and everywhere in the world. Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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Figure 2  Comparisons of the Risk Ratio Predictions 
 
  So what then is the resulting Posterior probability, p(P) in the future?  It is shown in Figure 2 
for a series of cases with varying learning or knowledge acquisition from increasing risk 
exposure or accumulated experience.  These cases are represented by the range of values shown 
for the learning “constant”, k, where progressively lower values mean less and less learning.  As 
can be seen, if learning is negligible so, k, is very small (say, 0.0001) then the event probability 
decreases almost as a straight line of constant risk, 1/τ, as it should; for larger k values a distinct 
kink or plateau occurs due to the presence of the always finite, non-zero failure rate due to the 
human involvement. 
 
5  Predicting Rare Events: Fat Tails, Black Swans and White Elephants 
 
Colloquially, a black swan is an unexpected and/or rare event, one that dramatically changes 
prior thinking and expectations.  
  Because rare events do not happen often, they are also widely misunderstood. Perhaps even 
previously unobserved, they are called “unknown unknowns” (Rumsfeld, 2003), or “Black 
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Swans”  (Taleb, 2007) precisely because they do not follow the same “rules” when already 
having many or frequent events.  Think of the space shuttle crashes we have already seen, the 
global collapse of financial companies that have occurred, or an aircraft apparently falling from 
the sky as it did recently over the Atlantic. They are the things we may or may not have seen 
before, but certainly did not expect to happen.  So when they do happen, perhaps even when 
being thought not possible, they do not apparently follow the trends, expectations, rules or 
knowledge we have built up for more frequent happenings.  
  There is no assured, easy or obvious “alarm”, indicator or built in warning signal, derivable 
by adjusting “filters” or data smoothing techniques.  As noted in (World Bank, 2009), “Whether 
these alarms are deemed informative depends on their association with subsequent busts.  The 
choice of a threshold above which an alarm is raised presents an important trade-off between 
the desire for some warning of an impending bust and the costs associated with a false alarm.  
Nonetheless, even the best indicator failed to raise an alarm one to three years ahead of roughly 
one-half of all busts since 1985.  Thus, asset price busts are difficult to predict.”  This is a 50% 
or even chance, which are no better odds than just tossing a coin.  
  In statistical language and usage, the rare events do not follow or fit in with the usual 
distributions of previous or expected occurrences.  The frequency and/or probability of 
occurrence lies somewhere outside the usual many expected multiples of the standard deviation 
for any sample distribution.  We may not even have a distribution of prior data anyway. In fact, 
Taleb  (Taleb, 2007) spends a considerable part of his popular book “The Black Swan” 
discussing, discounting and dismissing the use of so-called “normal distributions” such as the 
Gaussian or bell-shaped curves simply because they do not and cannot account for rare events 
even though many humans may think that they do.  Also rare events, like all events, as we have 
said, are always due to some apparently unforeseen combination of circumstance, conditions, 
and combination of things that we did not foresee, and all include the errors in our human made 
and managed systems (the Seven Themes). 
  By citing many empirical cases, Taleb (Taleb, 2007) also further argues forcibly that this 
“scale” variation destroys any and all credibility of using any Gaussian or “normal” distribution 
for prediction.  In that limited sense, he is right, as conventional sampling statistics based on 
fitting to some “normal” distributions using many observations is totally inapplicable for low Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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probability, one-of-a-kind rare, so-far-unobserved or unknown events.  To make a true prediction 
we must still use what we know about what we do not know, and we now know that the relevant 
“scale” is in fact our experience or risk exposure, which is what we have anyway, and is the 
basis for what we know or do not know about everything. 
  In Figure 3, we show the one-on-one head-to-head comparison of a normal (Gaussian) bell-
shaped distribution
3, compared to the reality of learning variations as they affect probability: it is 
clear that the Gaussian or normal distribution seriously underestimates risk, in this case the 
probability of an outcome, for large experience.  This inability of standard methods to predict the 
extremes of the distributions is itself is well known- but less well known is that the probability 
increase or plateau is due to the human element.  
  So the future chance, or posterior, of any event, even of an unknown unknown, is in fact 
given by estimating the Likelihood, p(L), something Taleb does not discuss at all.  Instead, the 
concept of “scalability” was invoked, which we have now shown and will demonstrate is 
actually the same thing as a conditional probability of whether it will occur, but disguised as 
another White Elephant.  
 
Figure 3  Predictions: illustrating the Gaussian distribution failure to include the "fat tail" due to the influence 
of the human element 
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  The impact of rare events can vary, particularly because they were somehow disruptive, 
unexpected or not predicted.  So impacts can be large, as for a financial crisis that affects 
everyone’s credit or bank account, (Taleb, 2007); or they can be negligible because they do not 
affect the overall industry but only the participants, as for a commercial airplane crash.  But both 
do not happen very often.  Because events occur randomly, we find it difficult to predict when 
and where they will happen, and can do so only with uncertainty.  So with rare events we are 
more uncertain as we have had limited learning opportunity, and we fear the unknown.  The risk 
we determine or sense can be defined as the uncertainty in the chance of such an event 
happening. It is perceived by us, individually and collectively, as being a high risk or not based 
on how we feel about it, and have been taught, trained, experienced, learnt, or indoctrinated.  The 
randomness is then inherent in the learning processes, in the myriad of learnt and unlearnt 
patterns, neural firings, legal rules, acquired skills, written procedures, unconscious decisions, 
and conscious interactions that any and all humans have in any and all systems.  Perversely, only 
by having such randomness, learning, skill, trial and error can order and learning patterns 
emerge.  We create order from disorder, learning as we go from experience and risk exposure, 
discerning the right and unlearning the wrong behaviours and skills.  So a rare Black Swan even 
if of major impact is indeed a White Elephant of no intrinsic value unless and only if we are 
learning. 
  We need to know what we do not know.  We cannot know what happens inside our brains 
and see the how the trillions of neural patterns, pathways and possibilities are wired, learnt, 
interconnected, rationalized and unlearned.  We cannot know the millions of things that any 
group of people will talk about, learn, exchange, review, revise, argue, debate, reject, use and 
abuse, each and every day, 24/7.  We cannot know all about how a machine or system will 
behave when subjected to the whims of inadequate design, poor maintenance, extreme failure 
modes, external damage, and poor or unsafe operation.  What we do know is that, because we 
are human, we do learn from our mistakes: this is the Learning Hypothesis (Petroski, 1985, 
(Ohlsson, 1996) (Duffey and Saull, 2002).  The rate at which we make errors, produce outcomes, 
and cause events reduces both as we gain experience and if and as we learn.  We make mistakes 
because we are human: the fat tail, the rare event, is because we are human.  If and as we gain Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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experience, this is equivalent to increasing our risk exposure too.  The risk increases whether by 
driving on the road, by trading stocks and investments, or by building and operating a 
technological system like a ship, train, rocket or aircraft. 
  Consistent with the principles of natural selection, those who do not learn, those who do not 
adapt and survive, are the failures and extinctions of history, overtaken by the unexpected and 
mistakes, the errors and the Black Swans of the past. 
 
6  Failure to Predict Failure: Scaling Laws and the Risk Plateau 
 
What do we know about what we do not know? We know that the four categories of knowns and 
unknowns are the Rumsfeld quartet: 
Known knowns  what is expected and already observed (in the past) 
Known unknowns  unexpected but observed outcomes (past outcomes) 
Unknown knowns  expected and not yet observed (in the future) 
Unknown unknowns  unexpected and not yet observed (future outcomes or rare events) 
  This is analogous to drawing both outcomes and non-outcomes from Bernoulli’s urn (Duffey 
and Saull, 2008), and the probability of a rare (unknown) event is determined if all we do is 
assume that it exists.  Thus, we have turned a Black Swan into a White Elephant  the fact that 
we have not observed it, do not know if it exists, but can rationally discuss it allows the fear, 
dread and risk perception to be quantified.  This is precisely what Taleb recommends  taking 
precautions against what it is we do not know about what we do now know. 
  We have defined a risk ratio, RR, which depends on the prior failure rate. But for a rare or 
unknown event the posterior probability of an unknown unknown, p(U,U) which has not 
happened yet is finite and is given by analogy to the “case of zero failures” in purely statistical 
analysis (Coolen, 2006, 105).  We can then obtain the mathematical estimate for knowing the 
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where, U, is some constant of proportionality.  This order of magnitude estimate shows a clear 
trend of the probability decreasing with increasing experience as an inverse square power law, τ
-
2. For every factor of ten increase in experience measured in some tau units, τ, the posterior 
probability falls by one hundred times.  It does not matter if we do not know the exact numbers: 
the trend is the key for decision making and risk taking.  The rational choice and implication is 
to trust experience and not to be afraid of the perceived Unknown. 
  But although useful for comparative trending purposes, such a purely statistical analysis 
excludes the key human involvement and uncertainty contribution.  Hence the risk of an 
unknown unknown decreases inexorably with our increasing experience, or risk exposure, only 
until a risk plateau is reached and no further decrease in probability is possible.  Therefore, 
continuing to extrapolate using such scaling power laws will always ultimately underestimate 
risk.  So the White Elephant is precisely the case of little or no learning corresponding exactly to 
a scaled probability inverse law, i.e., p(P) = n/τ, where the number of events, n, is one (n=1), 
simply because it is that first and rare event that was never previously observed or known.  So 
the probability, p, of any single rare event is always, 1/τ, the inverse of (one divided by) the 
exposure or experience measure, or “scale”.  As shown before in Figure 2, this is also a measure 
of the Risk Ratio, RR, and is equivalent numerically to the failure rate, λ.  So also shown in 
Figure 4 are the so-called “scalable” or pure “power” laws discussed by Taleb (Taleb, 2007), 
where the probability is assumed to fall as the more general inverse power law, p(P) = 1/τ
α.  
  Corresponding to the prior and the posterior variations without significant learning, for 
illustration, the “slope” parameter, α, is often taken as lying in the range between 1 and 2 which 
assumed values nicely cover the “true” curves for novice or zero experience, varying as, 1/τ, and 
for “unknown unknowns” varying as, 1/τ
2.  But these are “constant risk” lines that do not give 
the detailed shape or slope variations since they do not reflect the learning opportunity and the 
ultimate irreducible, finite, residual and non-zero risk rate.  Basically the incorrect inexorable 
decrease in risk predicted by a scale law is offset by the inevitability of risk due to the human 
element, causing the “fat tail” or plateau in the probability graph.  At a future (posterior) 
probability of order p<10
-5 the line intersects the learning curves, the rare event or Black Swan 
truly becomes a White Elephant, being of less value or lower risk than the actual and hence of no 
predictive value.  Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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Figure 4  The Rare Event Prediction and Risk Plateau 
 
  Popular because of its simplicity, the inapplicable power law form is widely used in the field 
of economics (known as an “elasticity”) when fitting the exponent to price or response time 
reduction (Duffey, 2004); in cognitive psychology (known as a “law of practice”) when applied 
to trials that constitute repetitive learning (Stevens and Savin, 1962); and in damage estimation 
for industrial failures and collapses (Hanayasu and Sekine, 2004).  This general “power law” 
form also fits social trends, such as word usage, books sold, website hits, telephone calls, and 
city populations, leading Taleb (Taleb, 2007) to further argue that this form represents true 
“scalability” which we can now recognise as the fundamental connection to learning and risk 
exposure.  Arbitrary adjustment of the exponent, α, in economics, social science and cognitive 
psychology is an attempt to actually account for and fit what we observe, but without trying to 
understand why the exponent is not unity nor placing limits on the extrapolations made beyond 
the known data used for the original fits. 
  The exponent is roughly constant only over limited ranges of data, otherwise it fails in 
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inverse “power law” type of relation is often known as a Pareto distribution
4 and Woo (Woo, 
1999, 224) explicitly further cautions that: “parameterizing a natural hazard loss curve cannot 
be reliably reduced to a statistical analysis of loss data, e.g., fitting a Pareto curve: damaging 
events are too infrequent for this to be sound.”  
  In fact, this failure to predict may even explain the proven poor capability of many economic 
models that by using a constant “elasticity” between price and demand and extrapolating we now 
know from data do not predict well!  We now know and can see from Figure 4 that the exponent 
is not constant and the variation in reality is due to the presence and effects of learning, with the 
larger exponent values and steeper slope encompassing the variation between the learning curves 
(Figure 3).  This variation represents uncertainty and constitutes the measure of risk if taken as a 
technique for making investment decisions. 
  Figures 3 and 4 contain much useful information.  Not only are the trends with learning clear, 
there is the tendency for risk to be smaller initially with more learning; and greater at larger 
experience due to the forming of a “plateau” of nearly constant risk (a Fat Tail, or potential 
Black Swan).  If we neglect this large human contribution and effect at large risk exposure then, 
Pareto lines, power laws, “normal” and log-normal distributions become White Elephants of 
little value, as being extrapolated they underestimate the risk.  A similar argument can be made 
for not using results from static or equilibrium VaR and CoVaR techniques (see (Taleb, 2007), 
and the papers presented at this NBER Systemic Risk Conference) which fit standard statistical 
distributions to financial asset data and then seek significance in the differences and trends out at 
the 1-2% “tail”, while ignoring again the dynamic human contribution and hence unaware of and 
not accounting for the systematic existence of the systemic risk plateau. 
  This presence of learning effects nicely explains the actual range of empirical values for the 
exponent, α, quoted by Taleb and others of between 1 and 2 - some systems evidently exhibit 
more or less initial learning than others as is shown in Figure 4. Including the statistical limit of 
unknown unknowns, the inverse power law simplification shows by definition if there are no 
events there is and can be no learning.  Strictly, we know this is not true, as we also learn 
something from the many and often irritating non-events, minor losses and near misses.  This so-
called incidental learning leads to the other extreme case of “perfect learning” (Duffey and Saull, Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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2008), where the event outcome probability still follows a learning curve until we have just one 
event, and then subsequently plummets to zero. 
  We stress here, in italics, that the power law form is a natural, simplified limiting variant of 
the more general “learning curve”, which naturally then also encompasses the occurrence of 
rare events.  
  The analysis of risk ratios due to the financial cost of individual events assumes that big 
losses or damage occur less often i.e., are rare or lower in frequency.  For example, Hanayasu 
and Sekine (Hanayasu and Sekine, 2004) argue that the rate of financial “damage” of events in 
industry decreases with the inverse of the damage or loss.  So generally the frequency of an event 
decreases with increasing cost as the probability density,  
 
dp/dτ ≈ constant / h
q+1 
 
 Here,  q, is yet another power law exponent chosen to fit some damage data, and is always 
such that q>1 so Hanayasu and Sekine assume that it lies in the range 2<q<3.  When the slope is 
an inverse cube such that, α ~3, there is a very rapid decline.  We analyzed this approach 
(Holton, G., 2004, 19) and found the risk ratio, RR, or damage ratio referenced to some initial 
known value, h0, and probability, p0, is then given by:  
 
RR = (h/h0) = (p/p0)
1/q 
 
  Extrapolation of the fitted line beyond the data range given shows a much faster decrease in 
risk ratio than usually observed or expected from a learning curve with a finite minimum that 
flattens out.  So the basic problem is that extrapolation of the size of the loss according to this 
“power law” (although it is not really a law at all) produces inaccuracy outside the known data 
range, does not account for learning, and also does not allow for the finite non-zero contribution 
of the human element (the extra “fat tail” shown in Figure 2).  We have fitted a MERE curve also 
to these damage data, and as a result the forward risk exposure, financial loss or uncertainty is 
grossly  underestimated because of omitting the human learning element.  This is really Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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uncertainty: we are predicting the variation in how big the losses will be for unknown events, 
based on what we know. 
  The chance of an unknown unknown or rare event also depends on whether or not you learn!  
Conversely, rare events and Black Swans are also simply events for which we have little or no 
learning.  The argument is then wrong that this type of inverse power variation represents “true” 
randomness, where there is no pattern other than that which is “scale” invariant (like fractals).  In 
fact the variation in probability or risk in reality is all due to whether we have been learning or 
not, at what rate we make or have made mistakes both in the past and in the future.  The true 
natural “scale” for all human-based systemic risk we have shown repeatedly is our experience, 
however that is defined and accumulated, as learning is not invariant with risk exposure.  What 
we know about the unknown is that we are human and remain so, learning as we go.  
  For the future unknown experience, the average future failure rate, <λ >, we will observe 
over any future risk exposure or operating interval, τ-τ0, is obtained by averaging the varying 















 Clearly,  the  apparent average rate also depends on the risk exposure interval, τ-τ0, over which 
we start and finish observing, or choose to record outcomes, or happen to be present, or are risk 
exposed. 
  We can show how these ideas work in practice by comparing to actual data for rare events, 
although this is strictly an oxymoron, as if the outcomes occur they are no longer “rare” or 
become known unknowns.  The data available is the case we have analyzed in detail before  
(Duffey and Saull, 2008)(Duffey and Saull, 2002) for fatal commercial airline crashes between 
1970-2000.  The case is relevant as the airline industry is regarded as relatively safe, and having 
perhaps attained the lowest possible event rate.  Over this 30-year period using modern jets, 
some 114 commercial passenger airlines accumulated about 220 million flights, and there were 
about 270 fatal crashes, excluding hull losses (plane write-offs) with no deaths.  The data show a 
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achievable of about one per 200,000 flying experience or risk exposure hours.  What has actually 
happened is that because they have actually become rare events there is an almost constant risk, 
as shown in Figure 5, where the fatal crash rate indeed varies inversely as, λ~1/τ, the number of 
accumulated flights being the measure of both the learning experience and risk exposure
5. 
  The analysis shows that the airlines having the least experience have the highest rate per 
flight, the airlines overall having descended the learning curve and achieved their lowest possible 
“rare” crash rate.  So for this case, flights accumulated represent a convenient measure of the risk 
exposure and learning “scale”.  The only larger interval found is for systems like dams, where 
humans are passive and not actively and/or continuously involved in the day-to-day system 
performance and operation. 
 
 
Figure 5  The prediction for rare aircraft crashes 
 
  But the relative future risk of a mature technology, as measured by the non-dimensional 
posterior outcome rate, is negligible compared to that for new technology.  The plunge in the 
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future prediction, p(P), of the risk at large experience, or the “thin tail” appearing in the end of 
the fat tail, is due to the prior probability becoming nearer and nearer to certainty (p→1) at large 
enough experience or risk exposure since the failure rate (according to all the world’s known 
outcome data) is never, ever zero.  Thus, we have found a basis on which to make predictions of 
all such rare unknown unknowns, based on the (equally) rare prior outcomes from many 
disparate sources. 
  We have already recently used the methods and ideas discussed here and in our book (Duffey 
and Saull, 2008) to risk, failure rate and reliability prediction for many important cases.  These 
include human errors and recovery actions in nuclear power plants (Duffey and Ha, 2009); 
predicting rocket launch failures and space crew safety for new systems (Fragola, 2009, 657); 
the time it takes for restoration of power following grid failure (or “blackout”) (Duffey and Ha, 
2009); predicting the rate of failure of heat exchanger tubing in new designs (Duffey and 
Tapping, 2009); and the quantitative tracking of learning trends (“safety culture”) in 
management and operation of large offshore oil and gas facilities (Duffey and Skjerve, 2008); 
and about 30 other key examples.  While each case has its own fascinating and unique 
experience and data, all examples and cases can be reduced to the common learning basis, and all 
follow the universal laws and rules for the outcomes due to us, as humans, functioning in modern 
society and technological systems, whether we know it or not. 
 
7  The Financial Risk: trends in economic growth rates, failure and stability  
 
The fundamental question is what are the relevant prior data, predictive failure rate and risk 
exposure measures in financial and economic systems when including the essential influence of 
the human involvement?  
  Like other systems with failures and outcomes, there are a lot of financial system data out 
there, both nationally and globally, and data are key to our understanding and analysis.  What are 
the right measures for failure (errors) and experience in financial systems?  Can the market 
collapse be predicted using these measures?  As an exercise in examining those questions, we 
explored the publicly available global financial data from the World Bank and the IMF, covering 
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credit markets, due to the collateralizing of risky (real estate) debt assets as leveraged securities 
in the developed economies and financial markets.  The present analysis is to determine the 
presence or not of precursors, the evidence or not of learning trends, and prediction of the 
probability of failure using the prior data. 
  Let us make a financial market system prediction based solely on what we know about other 
system failures. According to the data (and as shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4), we have learnt that 
there is an apparent fundamental and inherent inability, due to the inseparable involvement of 
humans in and with the technological systems, for the posterior (future) probability of an 
outcome to occur with a probability of less than p(P) < 10
-5.  This corresponds to the lowest 
observed rate of one outcome or failure in about 100,000 to 200,000 experience or risk exposure 
units  (Duffey and Saull, 2008) (Duffey and Saull, 2002).  If the global financial “market”, 
including real estate equities and stocks, is now defined as the relevant system with human 
involvement, and a trading or business experience of 24/7/365 taken as the appropriate risk 
exposure or experience measure, this implies we may expect and predict an average “market 
failure” rate ranging from not less than about once every ten years and not more than every 
twenty years. If lack of economic (GWP and/or GDP
6) growth, with financial credit and market 
collapse is taken as a surrogate measure of an outcome or failure
7, there has been apparently four 
relatively recent “crises” in the World (in about 1981-2, 1992-3, 1997-8 and 2008-9), and five 
“recessions” in the USA (circa 1972, 1980, 1982, 1990, and 2008) in the forty-year interval 
1970–2010 (IMF, 2009), being an average risk interval of between eight (nationally) to ten 
(globally) years.  In fact, in the full interval of 1870-2008, the IMF listed eight globally 
significant financial crises in those 138 years (the above four listed plus 1873, 1891-1892, 1907-
1908, 1929-1931), or ten when including the two World Wars [see 8, Figure 4.1].  All these 
various crises give an average interval of about one failure somewhere between every 8 to 17 
years, an agreement surprisingly close to and certainly within our present predictive uncertainty 
range of one about every ten to twenty years of risk exposure.  
  This present purely “rare event” prediction is a result that was not anticipated beforehand, 
and is based on failure data from other global and national non-financial systems, implying that 
the very same and very human forces are at work in financial systems due to human fallibility 
and mistakes.  The present rate-of-failure approach contrasts squarely with many other Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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unsuccessful predictive measures (IMF, 2009), and short and long-term bond rate spreads using 
“probit” probability curves tuned to the market statistical variations (Estrella and Mishkin, 1996, 
1).  So although we cannot yet predict exactly when, we can now say that the “economic market 
place” (EMP) is behaving and failing on average in the same manner and rates as all other 
known homo-technological systems.  We presume for the moment that this is not just a 
coincidence, and that the prior historical data are indeed telling us something about the 
commonality and causes of random and rare fiscal failures, and our ability or inability to predict 
systemic risk.  So we can now seek new measures for predictors or precursors of market failure 
and stability based on what we know. 
  We already know that the chance of such a major event “ever happening again” is given by 
the matching probability using conventional statistics, and this has the value of ~0.63, or about 
an equal chance of happening or not (Duffey and Saull, 2008).  This is a Repeat Event Prediction 
(REP) of a nearly equal chance. So for managing risk, we should expect another collapse based 
solely on this analysis, and probably with about the same average 10 to 20-year interval unless 
some change is made that impacts the human contribution.  The inevitably of failure is rather 
disheartening, and although uncomfortable seems to be the reality, so we should all at least 
proactively plan for it and hence be able to manage and survive the outcome, which is risk 
mitigation. 
  Having established the possible relevance of GWP and GDP, as an initial step the measure of 
the outcome rate is taken to be the % growth in GWP and GDP (positive growth being success, 
negative growth being failure), and the relevant measure for experience and risk exposure for the 
global financial system as the gross world product, GWP (T$), not in the usual calendar years as 
the interval over which the data are usually presented
8. 
  The result of the ULC analysis is shown in Figure 6 for the interval 1980-2003 (World Bank, 
2009), where the GDP growth rate, R, is the MERE learning curve form: 
 
R, % GWP = Rm + (R0 – Rm) exp - k (accGWP) 
 
where numerically, from the data comparison in Figure 6, 
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R = 0.08 + 8 exp-(accGWP/80) 
 
  The growth rate, R, is decreasing exponentially, and this expression is correlated with the 
data to an r
2 = 0.9, and importantly shows that by a GWP of order $600T the overall global 
growth rate is trending towards being negligible (<0.1%). 
  In non-dimensional form, relative to some initial growth rate, R0, this equation can be written 
as:  
 




Figure 6  The GWP Growth Rate Curve 
 
  It is worth noting that, as might be expected in global trading, the magnitude and growth 
many economies are apparently highly correlated with the accumulated GWP, so will follow 
similar trends as we see later.  For example, the straight line that gives the relation between the 
USA GDP and the GWP for the interval 1981 –2004 is: 
 
GDP (USA, $B) = 15{accGWP($T)}+3210, 
 
GDP Growth (IMF 1980-2003)
R =0.08 + 8 exp(-accGWP/80)
r^2=0.90946255  DF Adj r^2=0.89516716  FitStdErr=0.77785629  Fstat=100.45153
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with a correlation coefficient of r
2 = 0.99.  The magnitudes are hence very tightly coupled; but 
here we do not have to decide which is cause and which is effect (i.e., is the change in one due to 
the other, or vice versa?)
9 
  To be clear, we really wish to determine a global financial failure rate and the rate we are 
learning. So what is the relevant measure of the failure rate?  Now, globally governments and 
economies usually aim for increasing, or more slowly declining and hopefully non-negative 
growth.  We postulate that either of the following extremes can be taken as an equivalent and 
immediately useful measure of “economic failure” both varying with increasing accumulated 
GWP as a measure of total risk exposure:  
(a) the rate of decline in GWP growth rate; or  
(b) the rate of GWP growth rate itself. 
  By straightforward differentiation of the growth rate, R, we have the global failure or decline 
rate, λf, given by: 
 
λf ≡ - dR/dGWP = k(R0 – Rm) exp - k (accGWP)  
 
So, numerically, we may expect the rate of decline of growth (the global financial failure rate) to 
decrease with increasing risk exposure and experience and be given very nearly by, in units of 
%/GWP: 
 
λf = 0.1 exp - (accGWP/80) 
 
with the natural limit, λ0 = 0.1, so the relevant non-dimensional equation is,  
 
E* = λf / λ0 = exp – (accGWP/80).  
 
  The equations for R* and E* now allow a direct comparison to the systemic learning trends 
given by the ULC form, E*=exp-3N*, so we also plotted these two growth decline predictions 
(shown as the large crosses and circles
10) in non-dimensional form against all other world 
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assumptions basically: (a) the rate of decline of growth rate, λf, when equivalent to “financial 
failure”, is tracking somewhat below other adverse outcome data; while (b) the simple decline in 
growth rate R, is somewhat above other adverse data.  We can indeed establish and cover the 
range with these two failure measures, generally within the data scatter. 
  To our knowledge this is the first time that financial and economic systems have been 
compared to other modern systems.  We take the extraordinary fact that we can bring all these 
apparently disparate data together using the learning theory as evidence that the human 
involvement is dominant, not just in accidents and surgeries but also in economics, through the 
common basis of the fundamental decision and learning processes.  Globally, therefore, we can 
state that we have indeed learnt to reduce and manage the rate of overall economic decline, just 
as we have learned to correct errors and failures in other systems. 
 
Figure 7  The ULC and the GWP growth and failure rates 
 
  The implication is intriguing: if a declining rate of economic growth decline is indeed 
equivalent to an error, then the economies suffering declines in growth had even “learnt” to 
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eventually reaching an almost infinitesimal asymptotic rate of decline.  Further this result 
suggests that GWP is a useful measure for estimating risk exposure and the learning opportunity.  
 
8  Developing and Developed Economies: The Learning Link 
 
It has been suggested that this decline in growth rate represents “saturation” of the developed 
economies, and that major growth then only occurs in the developing economies.  To compare 
growth rates, the IMF and World Bank have also separated out the percentage GDP growth rates 
for “emerging” or developing countries/economies from “developed” or “advanced” 
countries/economies (World Bank, 2009).  
  Now the percentage growths are based on very different totals, so just for a comparison 
exercise, the % growth rate, πGR, in each grouping was defined relative to the absolute growth in 
the world, or GWP, as: 
 
πGR (%/$T) = % GDP Growth/(GWP $T x World % Growth) 
 
  In effect, this is a measure of the rate of economic growth rate relative to the total available 
economic growth “pie”.  The relative growth rate data calculated in this manner for the two 
groupings are shown in Figure 8 as a function still of the accumulated GWP, as well as the delta 
(or difference) in relative growth rate, {πGR (developed) – πGR (emerging)}, between the two 
“types” of economies.  The reason for taking the accumulated GWP as the experience measure is 
this is presumable some measure of available learning experience and risk exposure in the global 
trade between the two groups, and of the total available “pie”. Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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Figure 8  The differential decline of rates of GDP growth 
 
  What is seen is illuminating: the two growth rates (top dashed lines) are in anti-phase or 
negatively correlated: when one goes up, the other goes down, and vice versa.  One grows 
literally at the expense of the other.  There is also some periodicity in the divergence pattern, and 
evidence of emerging positive divergence in growth rates towards $600T in 2003+. The opposite 
correlation between the growth rates is clear  the developing economies have a positive 
correlation of ~ +0.9 and the developed economies a negative correlation of about –0.7 with 
increasing accumulated GWP.  As world wealth increases, one is declining, and the other is 
increasing in growth rate.  The implication is that the relative growth shares part of the global 
economy “pie” growth, and hence the economies themselves are indeed closely coupled, which 
is perhaps obvious in hindsight.  
  The prediction is clear based on these trends.  The developed world economies would 
actually go into near zero or into negative GDP growth rate in 2003+ (the projection is around 
2005-2006 when GWP exceeds $600T), after many years of decline.  The emerging economies 
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would continue to grow positively at 5% or more.  The difference in rates was highly oscillatory 
and is perhaps not stable, as the liquidity (credit) needed to fund growth in emerging economies 
cannot come from those developed economies whose available assets and economies are in 
decline.  So the implication is that  in a globalized economy where all the individual economies 
are linked or “tightly coupled”  there are unknown feedback and stability relationships at work 
that we need to examine. 
  A very first attempt was also made to predict the actual rate of the known global fiscal crises, 
where the key is again finding the relevant units for the measure of the risk exposure/experience, 
τ.  For the preliminary results shown in Figure 9, as listed in the IMF’s WEO2009, the 
experience was taken as GWP-years for the interval 1870-2009 with eight non-wartime crises. 
The resulting global crisis rate , λG, is,  
 
 λG = (Number of crises, per accumulated risk exposure years from 1870, accY).  
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  The theory line also shown in Figure 9 is derived from a MERE failure rate, which is firmly 
based on human learning, so that the equation is: 
 
λG = 0.059 + 0.2 exp-(accGWPy/230), 
 
with a correlation of r
2 = 0.958. 
 
  Clearly the predicted “tail” is nearly constant with the lowest presently attainable crisis rate 
of about 0.06 per year (or averaging one every 17 years), suggesting a plateau in the finite 
minimum rate due to human involvement.  Crises are occurring much faster than might have 
been expected using simple extrapolation with a power law: the number and rate of crises 
increases with risk exposure (i.e., with increasing GWP), which might seem to be rather obvious, 
producing yet another “fat tail”.  Despite the overall theoretical trend suggesting the crisis rate is 
at best constant and not decreasing further, the last four data points indicate that the crisis rate is 
actually slightly increasing and may constitute a new dynamic prediction of more frequent crises.  
While not asserting completeness at this early stage of the analysis, it is possible and highly 
desirable in the future to further examine the trends in these crisis data in more detail.  
 
9  Risk: Quantifying the Uncertainty  
 
How can we estimate the stability of a global or national system? The whole system is too 
complicated to predict its every move, behaviour or state: so how do we proceed? How can we 
estimate and predict the stability of a system when it is unpredictable?  Here we introduce the 
only known objective measure of uncertainty, complexity and randomness, and illustrate how it 
can be used to predict system stability.  
  Early work on economic stability (Solow, 1956, 65) focussed on presumed and arbitrary 
functional growth relationships between labour (employment) and wealth generation (capital) for 
determining equilibrium conditions
11.  The actual form of the economic growth function was not 
given or known, but using simple analytical functions, the possibility was shown for the 
existence of multiple alternate steady-states or equilibria.  But as clearly stated by Soros (Soros, Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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2009): “The financial system is far from equilibrium… The short term needs are the opposite of 
what is needed in the long term.” 
  Since financial markets are actually unstable and dynamic and not in equilibrium, the real 
need is to determine and predict the instant of and conditions for instability, not whether some 
ideal equlilibria or new steady state is achievable.  Markets just like the entire physical world are 
random, chaotic and unpredictable, so predicting frequent and rare events is risky and 
uncertain
12. Learning and randomness are powerful and unpredictable issues for risk prediction 
because we tend to believe that things behave according to what we know and, consciously or 
unconsciously, dismiss the risk what we have not seen or do not know about.  After all, we do not 
know what we do not know.  We, as humans, are the very product of our norms and patterns, our 
knowledge skills and experience, our learning patterns and neural connections, our social milieu 
and moral teachings, in the jobs, friends, lovers, lives, teachers, family and managers we happen 
to have.  We perceive our own risk based on what we think we know, rightly or wrongly, and 
what we have experienced. But in key innovations and new disciplines, where knowledge and 
skill is still emerging  areas like terrorism, bioengineering, neuroscience, medicine, economics, 
computing, automation, genetics, law, space exploration, and nuclear reactor safety  we have to 
know and to learn the risk of what we know about what we do not know.  We cannot possibly 
know everything, and these are all complex systems, with new and complex problems and lots of 
complexity, with much uncertainty. 
  The way to treat randomness and uncertainty has been solved in the physical sciences, where 
it was realised that unobserved fluctuations, uncertainty and statistical fluctuations govern and 
determine the actually observed behaviours and distributions.  Events can happen or appear in 
many different ways, which is literally the “noise” that surrounds and confuses us, whereas what 
we actually observe is the most likely but also contains information about the “signal” that 
emerges or is embedded, as order emerges from disorder, and we process and discard the 
complexity.  In fact, not just the physical world but the whole process of individual human 
response time and decision-making has been shown to be directly affected by randomness, in the 
so-called Hick-Hyman law (Duffey and Saull, 2008).  As individuals and as collectives, we do 
and must process complexity, both in our brains and in our behaviour, seeking the signal from all 
the noise, the learning patterns from the mistakes, the information from all the distractions. Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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Systematic processing and the perverse presence of complexity are essential for establishing 
learning distribution patterns. 
  The number of different ways something can appear, or be ordered, in sequence, magnitude, 
position and experience, is mathematically derivable and is a measure of the degree of order in 
any system (Duffey and Saull, 2008).  The number of different ways is a measure of the 
complexity, and is determined by the Information Entropy, H, which is also a measure of what 
we know about what we do not know, or the “missing information” (Baierlein, 1971), which is a 
measure of the risk.  The relation linking the probability of any outcome to the entropy is well 
known from both Statistical Physics and Information Theory, and is the objective measure of 
complexity: 
 
Information Entropy, H = Sum (p x natural logarithm, p) = - Σ p lnp 
 
  Note that the units adopted or utilized for the entropy are flexible and arbitrary, both by 
convention and in practice as being a comparative measure of order and complexity.  So this 
measure of uncertainty requires a statement of probability.  Now Taleb (Taleb, 2007) noted in his 
notes that:  “I am purposely avoiding the notion of entropy because the way it is conventionally 
phrased makes it ill-adapted to the type of randomness we experience in real life”.  We dismiss 
this assertion, and proceed to make this very subtle notion applicable to financial systemic risk 
simply by rephrasing it.  
  To make the entropy concept adaptable and useful for “experience in real life” all we have to 
do is actually relate and adapt the information entropy measure to our “real life experience”, or 
risk exposure interval, as we have already utilized (Duffey and Saull, 2008) (Duffey and Saull, 
2002) and have also introduced above.  So we can now change the phrasing and the adaptability, 
since above we unconventionally phrase entropy as being “an objective measure of what we 
know about what we do not know, which is the risk”.  In support of this use and phraseology, 
other major contributors have remarked:  
“Entropy is defined as the amount of information about a system that is still unknown after one 
has made….measurements on the system” (Wolfram, 2002). Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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“This suggests that … entropy might have an important place in guiding the strategy of a 
business man or stock market investor” (Jaynes, 2003). 
“Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty and the uncertainty, or entropy, is taken as the measure 
of the amount of information conveyed by a message from a source” (Pierce, 1980). 
“The uncertainty function … a unique measure for the predictability (uncertainty) of a random 
event which also can be used to compare different kinds of random events” (Greiner et al, 1997, 
150).” 
  There is no other measure available or known with these fundamental properties and 
potential, particularly for handling uncertainty and randomness, the processing and influence of 
complexity, and providing the objective measure of order.  This measure also has direct 
application to the subjective concept of ‘resilience engineering’, where ‘resilience is the intrinsic 
ability of an organisation (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, which 
allows it to continue operation after a major mishap and/or the presence of a continuous stress’ 
(Hollnagel et al, 2006).  But “resilience”, just like “culture”, has not been actually measured or 
quantified anywhere: it is simply a desirable property.  We have developed the numerical and 
objective system organizational stability (SOS) criterion that incidentally unifies the general 
theory and practice of managing risk through learning (Duffey and Saull, 2008).  This criterion is 
also relevant to ‘crisis management’ policies and procedures, and emergency response centres in 
major corporations, facilities and industries.  
 
10.  System and Organizational Stability: SOS 
 
The function of any “management system” is to create order from disorder, be it safety, 
regulatory, organizational or financial and hence to reduce the entropy.  Hence, for order to 
emerge from chaos, and for stability in physical systems, the incremental change in entropy, 
which is the measure of the disorder, must be negative (Kondepudi and Prigogine, 1998).  Our 
equivalent stability of organizational systems (SOS) criterion or indicator then arises imply from 
the fact that the incremental change in risk (information entropy, H) with changes in probability 
must be negative, or decreasing with increasing risk exposure.  In any experience increment we 
must have the inequality, expressed in differential form to reflect dynamic change: Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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dH/dτ ≤ 0 
 
Stated in words, for financial systems and markets, this SOS criterion states that there must be an 
incremental decrease in complexity with increasing or changing risk exposure.  Conversely, 
increasing complexity with incremental risk exposure is systemically unstable. 
 
This key condition or indicator also requires that a maximum (‘peak’) exists in our changing 
missing information or state of order as a function of experience and/or risk exposure, equivalent 
to a meta-stable condition.  To illustrate this variation, consider the limit cases of concern of the 
probability/possibility/likelihood of another collapse event, having observed a similar one 
already, considering all our previous knowledge.  From the past experience we showed that the 
prior probability for repeat events (REP) is, with little learning, p≈(1-1/e)=0.63, and also this 
same value holds for novice mistakes with little experience (when τ→0).  For the future risk, the 
posterior probability, with little learning, is p≈1/τ, for rare events and also for highly experienced 
systems (when τ→∞).  
  For the two limited learning cases of the prior (past MERE) and posterior (future rare event) 
the entropy increment, dH=-plnp in any risk interval can be calculated.  The results are shown in 
Figure 10 as a function of the experience or risk exposure interval, N*, which purely for 
convenience has been non-dimensionalized to the maximum experience or risk exposure.  For 
the example known “prior” case, entropy is calculated from the MERE probability result with 
little learning (k=0.0001); the decrease in entropy at larger experience or risk exposure for the 
prior case is due to the probability of an outcome finally reaching a certainty, p~1, as ultimately 
there is no uncertainty.  For the unknown “posterior” case, the entropy is calculated from p=1/τ; 
the peak in entropy at small experience is simply due to the greater uncertainty, which decreases 
as experience is gained. 
  Also shown in the Figure 10 is the purely theoretical prediction obtained from SEST, the 
statistical error state theory (Duffey and Saull, 2008), which treats outcomes as appearing 
randomly.  The theory derives the most likely statistical distribution of outcomes, and relates the 
probability of the outcomes with variation in the instantaneous depth  of experience or risk Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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exposure in any given risk interval.  The information entropy, H, is the measure of the 
complexity in any interval and is given by integrating the resulting exponential probability 
distributions, to obtain: 
 
H = ½ (p0 exp – aN*)
2 (aN* + ½) 
 
  At small experience, as N*→0, the above SEST result becomes, H→0.25, which is close to 
the prior value with little learning of H→0.29, so the two results are also consistent in their limits 
as they should be.  The value of the slope parameter or learning exponent, a, is derived 
deliberately from very diverse prior data sets for failure distributions which are very detailed and 
complete
13.  The theory line in Figure 10 utilizes the “best” a=3.5 in the above exponential 
distribution as a working approximate estimate for comparison purposes, which is close to the 
learning rate constant value, k~3. For most of the experience or risk range shown the entropy is 
not decreasing significantly until sufficient experience is attained.  
   Figure 10 itself contains information about what we know about what we do not know, so is 
worth some more discussion.  Knowns (prior or past) apparently contain more uncertainty (H is 
larger) than unknowns (posterior or future), except at very early or little experience (N*<10
-4).  
The shapes of the curves are of interest for another reason: for evaluating the system 
organizational stability (SOS) criterion. By inspection of the two cases in Figure 10, this stability 
condition is only met or satisfied at small experience for the unknowns, and at large experience 
for the knowns.  
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Figure 10  Entropy variations with experience, knowledge and risk exposure: stability indicator  
 
  Basically, at small experience unless learning is occurring the existing system is unstable and 
in danger of repeat events until very large experience is attained.  Conversely, any future system 
is also initially unstable until sufficient post entry experience has been attained. So learning  or 
decreasing complexity  is essential for stability, and this is plainly relevant to the market 
stability when introducing the use of new and/or complex financial instruments. 
  Quoted at the very beginning of this essay, we can now return to the statement in (Soros, 
2009) that “markets are unstable”, a controversial assertion when contrasted with normal 
economic theory based on near-equilibrium markets (the balance between supply and demand as 
reflected in price). To test this assertion, the data points shown as circles in Figure 10 are for the 
trial “crisis entropy” estimates calculated using the preliminary probability values for rare events, 
p ≈ n/accGWP, where, n, is simply the number of observed crises, and the risk interval or 
experience has been non-dimensionalized on the basis of the accumulated GWP from 1870-
2009. The general data trend is downward (i.e. stable) until the last few data points for the crises 
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the slope of the last four data points being positive satisfies the formal indicator (the criterion  
dH/dτ > 0) for inherent global market instability, as has been previously suggested (Soros, 2009).  
 
The present results and stability indicator are based on the inclusion of the uncertainty due to 
human decision making and risk taking, and thus quantifies and supports the idea independently 
and effectively simultaneously proposed by Soros(Soros, 2010) of the Human Uncertainty 
Principle
14 .  This Principle is firmly based on experience and learning from investment and 
market behaviours, and proposes that human involvement and risk taking inherently introduces 
risk due to incomplete knowledge and complexity, resulting in intervention actions in the market 
based on imperfect understanding  that have unintended consequences, in what Soros describes 
as “reflexivity”. 
 
This new data comparison suggests that entropy is indeed a potentially significant indicator that 
should not be simply “avoided” as Taleb does, and represents our best and most refined state of 
knowledge regarding systemic risk.  We have now actually quantified the behavior of the chaotic 
and random financial market. As to regulation of systemic risk, this is really about regulating 
such unknown uncertainty (Brown, S. 2009, 209), while meeting the stated goals (Brown, 2009) 
(RECP, 2008):  “to be effective and worthy of public trust, any governance system must be able 
to demonstrate technical competence. Effective and trustworthy governance arrangements must 
have four key qualities: informed, transparent, prospective and adaptive”.  We have provided 
new technically-founded measures for the basis of a governance system which are: (a) informed 
by the actual world data and validated; (b) transparent both in their calculation and in using the 
precepts that describe human learning and risk taking; (c) prospective and future orientated by 
being able to make actual predictions; and (d) adaptive to generally encompass changes in 
chaotic markets, risk exposure and financial systems. 
 
11  Concluding Remarks: Our New Methods and Measures provide this framework for 
objective and predictive governance.  
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An exercise such as predicting the “next” recession or crisis becomes simply equivalent to 
determining the probability of and risk interval for the “next” event or outcome.  This probability 
must be based on relevant and correlated measures for experience and risk exposure, which 
include the presence or absence of learning. We have analyzed the world economic data to make 
a prediction of the “next” crisis probability based on the presence and influence of human risk 
taking and decision making in financial markets
15. 
  We have summarised some recent ideas on risk prediction  for multiple technological 
systems, using the existing data, and have explicitly included the key impact of human 
involvement using the learning hypothesis, namely that we learn from our mistakes.  This ability 
of homo-technological systems to learn from experience reduces risk and errors, but also 
produces a “fat tail” as the processes of learning, making errors and risk taking persist.  We have 
related these ideas to the prediction of rare events, systemic risk, and organizational stability in 
global systems and, although we do not pretend to have all the answers, there are clear directions 
to follow.  Risk is caused by our uncertainty, and the measure of uncertainty is probability.  The 
risk of an outcome (accident, event, error or failure) is never zero, and the possibility of an 
outcome always exists, with a chance given by the future (posterior) probability.  The key is to 
include the human involvement, and to create and use the correct and relevant measures for 
experience, learning, complexity and risk exposure.  
  Standard statistical distributions and indicators presently used for financial systems (e.g., as 
used in VaR, or yield spread) are known to not be applicable for predicting rare events, systemic 
risk, crises and failures. Because of the human involvement, the risk becomes greater than just by 
using a Gaussian, normal or simple power law, until we reach very, very large experience and 
would have had a prior event anyway. We have a greater chance of outcomes and unexpected 
unknown unknowns if we are not learning than we might expect even from and if using simple 
“scaling” or “power laws”.  This is simply because we are humans who make mistakes, take risks 
and cannot be error free.  In colloquial terms, the human adds another “fat tail” to an already 
“fat tail”. 
  So the past or prior knowledge indeed informs the future risk: what we know from what we 
already know from the probability of what were once past unknowns tells us about the 
probability of the unknown unknowns in the future, too.  Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
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  The measure adopted and used and relevant for estimating risk exposure is key.  Over some 
seven to eight decades (orders of magnitude) variation in the rate and in the risk exposure or 
accumulated experience, for the rare event the negligible learning prediction holds.  At any 
future experience or risk exposure, the error (or uncertainty) in the risk prediction is evidently 
about a factor of 10 in future crisis occurrence probability, and about a factor of two in average 
crisis frequency. 
  We have suggested several major factors and useful measures that influence the prediction of 
risk and stability in financial systems, based on what we observe for all other systems with 
human involvement: 
a)  the Universal Learning Curve provides a comparative indication of trends;  
b)  the probability of failure/loss is a function of experience or risk exposure;  
c)  the relevant measure of failure is the rate of decline in GDP growth rates;  
d)  a relevant measure of experience and risk exposure is the accumulated GWP;  
e)  stable systems are learning systems that reduce complexity;  
f)  an absolute measure of risk and uncertainty is the Information Entropy, which reflects 
what we know about what we do not know;  
g)  unique condition exists for systemic stability;  
h)  repeat events are likely;  
i)  existing systems are unstable unless learning is occurring; and  
j)  new systems are unstable at small experience.  
  The rare events are essentially all the same, whether they be aircraft crashes, space shuttle 
losses, massive explosions, or huge financial crises: we know nothing about them until they 
actually happen, when and if they occur almost magically becoming “known unknowns”.  We 
learn from them only after they have happened at least once.  But based on what we know about 
what we do not know, we can always estimate our risk and whether we are learning or not.  The 
rare unknown unknowns, or colloquially the “fat tails” or “Black Swans” of the unpredictable 
rate distributions, are simple manifestations of the occurrence of these outcomes whenever and 
wherever they happen.  We can and must expect them to continue to appear.  
  In our previous published work (Duffey and Saull, 2008), we had quantified the uncertainty 
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organizational and management desiderata of “safety culture” and “organizational learning” as a 
function of experience.  This is the first time, to our knowledge, that information entropy has 
been introduced as an objective prediction of the subjective feeling of “risk exposure” in the 
presence or absence of learning.  As to regulation of systemic risk, this is about regulating 
uncertainty, so that we demonstrate technical competence.  We provide measures and indicators 
for the guidance of effective and trustworthy governance arrangements that possess the four key 
qualities of being informed, transparent, prospective and adaptive. 
  The work and concepts discussed in this paper are only a necessary first step in developing 
understanding for predicting and managing risk in complex systems with human involvement.  
This new application to financial systems and markets, and the adoption of new measures 
requires time, patience and can also introduce risk.  Further work is clearly needed in this whole 
arena of system stability, the selection of relevant experience measures, and the quantification 
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Appendix: probability definition 
 
The  outcome  probability is just the cumulative distribution function, CDF, conventionally 
written as F(τ), the fraction that fails by τ, so: 
 
p(τ) ≡ F(τ) = 1- exp - ∫λdτ  
 
where the failure rate: 
 
λ(τ) = h(τ) = f(τ)/R(τ) = {1/(1-F)}dF/d τ, and the p.d.f. f(τ) = dF/d τ. 
 
  Carrying out the integration from an initial experience, to any interval, τ, we obtain the 
probability of an outcome as the double exponential: 
 
p(τ) = 1 – exp {(λ- λm)/k – λmτ)}  
 
where, from integrating the minimum error rate equation (MERE), (dλ/dτ) = - k(λ-λm), the failure 
rate is: 
 
λ(τ) = λm + (λ0 - λm) exp - kτ  
 
and (τ0) = 0 at the initial experience, accumulated up to or at the initial outcome(s), and 0 = 
1/τ for the very first, rare or initial outcome, like an inverse “power law”.  
  In the usual engineering reliability terminology, for, n, failures out of N total, the failure 
probability,  
 p(τ) = (1 - R(τ)) = # failures/total number = n/N, and the frequency is known if, n and N are 
known (and generally N is not known). 
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1 We define a homo-technological system as the complex and inseparable involvement of humans in any and all 
aspects of design, construction, operation, management, maintenance, regulation, production, control, conduct and 
decisions. 
2 See the definitions and derivations in the Appendix. 
 
3 The example Gaussian (or normal) distribution shown in Figure 3 is p(P) = 23exp(-0.5 (τ+290)/109)
2, and was 
fitted to the MERE learning curve using the commercial statistical software routine TableCurve 2D.  
 
4 Also termed the hyperbolic or power-law distribution, the form given by Woo for natural catastrophes is: 
p()=ba
b/
b+1, where a and b are constants, the so-called “location” and “shape” parameters. 
5 The seeming paradox with using event rate as a measure of risk for rare events is that the rate and number 
seemingly fall with increasing experience (not just time), giving an apparent decrease when in fact the risk of a 
random outcome is effectively still constant. 
 
6 GWP and GDP are conventional  acronyms for Gross World Product and Gross Domestic Product 
7 The recent IMF World Economic Outlook 2009 in fact shows for the 2008 crisis there is a relation between 
household liabilities and credit growth in relation to GDP growth ([18, Figure 3.10]). 
 
8 A reviewer noted that for systemic risk it is reasonable and not unexpected that GWP is an alternative measures to 
calendar year, and that experience may also be reflected in and by trading volumes. Indeed, for establishing learning 
trends we need available and open measures that are relevant to experience and risk exposure, and encourage the 
study and search for relevant measure 
9 As pointed out by one of the Discussers of this paper, the “tight coupling” condition is one of those qualities 
proposed for the occurrence of so-called “normal accidents” (Perrow, 1984). 
 
10 This graph and comparison now responds to a point arising in the Discussion at the first draft presentation of this 
paper as to the relevant measure for “failure” in global systems that exhibit varying growth rates. 
11 The author is grateful to Ms. Christina Wang for pointing out both this reference and its relevance: for the present 
discussion we presume that “wealth creation” can be related or correlated to GWP and GDP.  
 
12 The inherent randomness is often termed the aleatory uncertainty by statisticians. 
13 Specifically, we used: (a) US commercial aircraft near mid-air collisions (NMACs) for 1987-1998, where 
experience and risk exposure is measured by total flights; and (b) Australian traffic fatalities from 1980-1999 where 
experience and risk exposure is measured in driver-years (as shown in [5, Figure 8.8]). Presented at Federal Reserve Board – NBER Research Conference on Quantifying Systemic Risk, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., 06 Nov 2009, paper submitted for publication in the NBER Conference 
Journal, 2010. 
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14 By delightful chance within a week of each other on two continents, the verbal Soros “Lectures” were  given on 
October 26-30 ,2009 in Budapest, and the present paper presented at the NBER Research Conference  on November 
6, 2009 in Boston 
 
15 In response to a question raised in discussion at the Conference, the present estimate and prediction based on past 
data is for one global financial crisis occurring at least every 8 to 17 years, becoming more frequent in the future as 
the GWP and concomitant risk exposure grow. Knowing this fact, the keys are to be prepared for crisis and pro-
active in risk management. 
 